OBJECTIVE AND CONTEXT OF RESEARCH
This study is an attempt to model shopping centre rents and to investigate whether agglomeration economies are a driving force in the rent determination process. It is part of a research program based on physical and financial information obtained from seven superregional, regional and community shopping centre managers in Quebec City for the 1998-2000 period. At this point, some 784 shops are covered in the study with gross base rent, operating expenses and gross leasable area being available for all of them. Partial information on store frontage, lease duration as well as yearly sales is also available. When completed, the data bank will include a series of shopping centre amenities and design features (physical configuration, parking facilities, landscaping, etc.) as well as neighbourhood characteristics (household composition and income) and urban externalities (accessibility to services, proximity of competitors, etc.) in order to account for all major internal and external determinants of shopping centre rents.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The academic literature on shopping malls has evolved around various theories of urban spatial structure (Hotelling, 1929; Christaller, 1933; Lösh, 1940 and Alonso, 1964) with strategies relating to mall configuration and store location within shopping centres replicating those observed at the urban level (Vandell and Lane, 1987; Pearson, 1991; Brueckner, 1993; Roulac, 1996; Brown, 1999) . In contrast to what prevails in the residential market (Follain and Malpezzi, 1980; Noland, 1980; Sirmans and Benjamin, 1991; Benjamin and Sirmans, 1994; Jud et al., 1996; Thériault, 1994 & Chinloy and Maribojoc, 1998) and office sector (Rosen, 1984; Hekman, 1985; Gabriel and Nothaft, 1988; Wheaton and Torto, 1995; Sivitanides, 1997) where the rent issue has been widely investigated, studies on the dynamics of commercial rent structuring remain embryonic because of the confidential nature of the required information.
The mechanics underlying additional, or overage rents -expressed as a percentage of yearly sales over and above a given, pre-negotiated threshold -are among the issues raised by authors (Hartzell et al., 1987; Benjamin et al., 1990; Bruecker, 1993; Colwell et al., 1998; Wheaton, 2000; Chun et al, 2001) . Benjamin et al. (1990) were the first to apply hedonics to the analysis of commercial rent. In their study, base rents derived from 103 commercial leases pertaining to national, local and independent stores are regressed against sales, discount rates, overage rents, lease terms, lease provisions, etc. Results suggest that while base rents are lower where higher overage rent rates apply, they rise with higher sales thresholds. In another similar study, Sirmans and Guidry (1993) point out that higher consumer traffic levels are a prerequisite for the success of a store. In a totally different urban context, Tay et al. (1991) investigate the Hong Kong commercial market. Their data base includes 405 stores distributed among nine high-rise shopping centres. In contrast with the literature, their study namely reveals that rent level is positively related to the age of a shopping centre due to both customers' fidelity -which tends to grow with time -and continuous improvements to buildings. It also suggests that while the unit rent of a store is positively correlated with the size of a centre, it is inversely related to its own size. This latter finding brings us to the core of the current paper, that is agglomeration economies.
With location theories as the conceptual background (Weber, 1929) , sales potential in shopping centres are looked upon through the concepts of agglomeration economies and externalities derived from the presence of anchor tenants (Eaton and Lipsey, 1983; Mulligan, 1983; West et al., 1985; Ghosh, 1986; Ingene and Ghosh, 1990; Fisher and Yezer, 1993; Eppli and Benjamin, 1993; Mejia and Benjamin, 2002) as well as from tenant mix and product diversity (Konrad, 1984; Pashigan and Gould, 1998) . Behind the concept of agglomeration economies lies the reduction of consumer search and of uncertainty costs.
Such advantages allow major tenants to negotiate lower rents with shopping centres' owners (Anderson, 1985) , the fact that their departure may cause rental income to drop by as much as 25% (Gatzlaff et al., 1994) greatly enhancing their bargaining power.
According to Nelson (1958) and Eppli and Shilling (1996) , the clustering of similar stores leads to an increase in their total sales level, thereby contributing to the success of the shopping centre.
The image of a shopping centre may also impact upon sales level (Brown, 1992; Kirkup and Rafiq, 1994; Anikeeff, 1996) . It stems from consumers' perception of major occupants (Nevin and Houston, 1980) , shopping centre size and configuration as well as the quality of goods and services offered. In this respect, image is increasingly dependent upon fashion (James et al, 1976; Jain and Etgar, 1976; Mazursky and Jacoby, 1986; Grewal, 1998) .
Similarly, it affects tenants in their negotiation for an optimal location (Mejia et al., 2001) .
Finally, accounting for all these features raises the spatial autocorrelation issue, recently addressed by Carter and Haloupek (2000) on the grounds of previous work performed mainly on the residential market (Griffith, 1987; Pace and Guilley, 1998; Dubin et al., 1999) .
DATA BANK AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Original Data Bank
As mentioned earlier, this study is based on physical and financial information obtained for seven super-regional (2), regional (2) and community (3) 
Structural and Cyclical Attributes
In addition to basic financial and physical characteristics, a series of five market structure and cyclical attributes are developed in order to capture the effect on rent of both commercial dynamics within shopping centres and overall economic situation. These are:
Lease duration (LEASEDURN): It might be expected that risk reduction deriving from a longer lease term should result in a rent discount for the tenant, provided that regional commercial rents at the time of negotiation are relatively stable or declining; otherwise, a longer than average term may penalize the landlord.
An agglomeration index (AGGLOMINDX): Defined as the ratio of GLA for a given retail category within a shopping centre to total GLA in that centre, this index measures agglomeration economies resulting from the amalgamation of a large number of tenants in a given field of retail activity and, therefore, from the increased consumer traffic it implies. It should be expected that the larger the index, the higher the rent that the landlord can extract from tenants in that category.
A concentration index (CONCNINDX): While the landlord can take advantage of the abundance of retailers in a given commercial category, he will in contrast be prone to grant a rent discount where relatively few tenants are in control of the field, since any defection might induce a severe drop in yearly revenues. The Herfindahl Index, designed at measuring industrial concentration, is used here. Since it accounts for both the number of stores in a retail category and their relative share of the total GLA, it mirrors the level of competition in a field and the bargaining power of tenants. It can be assumed that the larger the index, the lower the rent paid.
The GLA open to negotiation (OPENLEASE) in any given year is also a good indication of the bargaining power of tenants in a shopping centre. Indeed, where a substantial proportion of total GLA is under negotiation at the same time, the landlord should be expected to grant rent discounts in order to avoid massive departures to competitors. Therefore, the higher the index, the lower the rent. 
Analytical approach
Two functional forms are used in the study, namely the linear and log-linear ones; a logarithmic transformation is also applied to the GLA variable. Exhibit 3, displaying basic descriptive statistics for all variables, clearly indicates that neither NETRENT nor GLA are normally distributed; Figure 1 provides further evidence of this. Hence the rationale for such transformations. While included in the data base and available for some 526 stores, unit sales (SALES/SQFT) are not included in the analysis at this stage of the research. The final calibration of the equations involves the removal of 15 extreme residuals considered to be highly detrimental to the model performances; these represents less than 2% of the initial data base. Finally, the regression procedure adopted is a combination of both standard and stepwise approaches.
MAJOR FINDINGS
The Linear Form -Model A
As can be seen from Exhibit 4, the linear model yields interesting results in spite of the nonlinearity of the dependent variable. While the explanatory performance of Model A, which displays an adjusted R-Square of 0,714 and a F value of 84,2, is quite fair, its predictive performance remains rather weak: considering the global average rent ($64), the relative SEE stands at 38,4%, which was to be expected in the light of the highly skewed distribution of the NETRENT/SQFT variable. Examination of the regression coefficients suggests that no inconsistency can be detected with respect to either their magnitude or sign, with the exception of the ANCHOR parameter estimate which is unexpectedly positively signed whereas it should be negative. Safe for a few coefficients whose statistical significance do not meet the 0,10 (CYCLE91_92; SPECIALTY*SREG) or the 0,05 (SHOESTORE*COM; AGGLOMINDX*REG) threshold, all other descriptors exhibit strong t values. Most interestingly, the two structural attributes indicative of tenants' bargaining power (CONCNINDX*SREG and OPENLEASE*REG) emerge as significant and with the right sign.
Considering that the linear model may not provide the best indications on the hedonic shopping centre rent function, let us turn to Model B for a more reliable interpretation of the coefficients obtained via the log-linear form.
The Log-Linear Form -Model B
Regression results for Model B are shown in Exhibit 5. While overall performances obtained with the log-linear form are quite similar to those derived from the linear one 1 , the statistical significance of parameter estimates is substantially improved for most descriptors. Only one coefficient (KIOSK*REG) is not significant at the 0,05 level while all coefficient signs -including that of the ANCHOR variable -are in line with theoretical expectations. Most important though, four out of five structural and cyclical variables emerge as statistically significant, lease duration (LEASEDURN) alone being rejected from the model. As for excessive multicollinearity, VIFs suggest that there is none, the highest VIF value standing at 2,89, which is well below the critical threshold of 10. In spite of that, it is interesting to note that there might be a structural link between store agglomeration (AGGLOMINDX*REG) and the clothing retail sector (CLOTHING*REG) in regional shopping centres.
In order to make an adequate interpretation of the implicit rents of commercial attributes derived from Model B, it is appropriate to keep in mind the retail structure of shopping centres. In that respect, Exhibit 1 may prove very helpful.
Interpreting the coefficients of basic physical and retail category attributes
As expected, the prominent role of gross leasable area in the retail rent determination process clearly emerges from the model, the negative sign of the Ln_GLA coefficient indicating that unit rent decreases with store size. More precisely, increasing average store size (3 000 sq. ft.) by 10% will result in a 2,4% drop in unit rent 2 . As shown by the Beta, standardized coefficient, frontage is also a major determinant 3 and exerts a positive influence on rent due to the enhanced visibility and attractiveness it confers to a store.
Thus, raising the mean frontage (34 ft.) by 10% increases unit rent by roughly 1,5%.
Quite interestingly, the presence of a jewellery impacts differently on rents depending on the size category of the shopping centre it belongs to. In community shopping centres (JEWELRY*COM), the effect is negative whereas it is positive in both regional (JEWELRY*REG) and super-regional (JEWELRY*SREG) structures. A twofold explanation can be brought forward: on the one hand, the relative scarcity of this retail activity in community centres (6,8% of stores and 1,6% of GLA) as opposed to regional centres where jewellers are in excess (25,7% of stores and 3,0% of GLA) translates into a rent discount in the former case and in a location premium in the latter case. On the other hand, jewellery stores located in community centres typically offer cheaper products than those found in more glamorous, either regional 4 or super-regional ones that also benefit from agglomeration economies; hence the positive sign of the latter coefficients. The same rationale, combining relative scarcity, prestige location and agglomeration economies, applies -with even greater relevance -to clothing and shoe stores located in community (negative sign) and regional (positive sign) shopping centres.
Agglomeration economies are clearly at stake when it comes to interpreting the marginal contribution of restaurants to unit rents, with regional and super-regional centres commanding substantially higher rents than community ones. Rent patterns differ though with respect to personal services and specialty stores. In spite of their relative abundance, the negative coefficients assigned to the SERVICES*COM and SPECIALTY*COM estimates reflect the bargaining power of local retailers that are at the very core of community centres' mission, namely proximity services. In contrast to all other statistically significant retail categories, specialty stores located in super-regional centres (SPECIALTY*SREG) also command lower unit rents: according to the "combined" and "compared" purchase concept, consumers are attracted by high-tech specialty stores (computer, audio and video stores) which, for that reason, benefit from rent discounts;
hence the negative sign attached to the related coefficient.
Kiosks are found only in regional and super-regional shopping centres. Since they occupy the central alley of shopping malls where consumer traffic is optimal, they generate very high sales per square foot and, consequently, command the highest unit rents of all retail categories. Their contribution to the retail rent determination process is among the interesting findings of this study. While the KIOSK*REG coefficient is only significant at the 0,10 level, the parameter estimate of the KIOSK*SREG descriptor (Beta coefficient of 0,286) undoubtedly suggests that kiosks located in super-regional centres substantially increase their overall profitability; actually, the unit rent they pay represents a 144% premium over the base (intercept) rent. Finally, anchor tenants do benefit, as expected, from a major rent discount; while it amounts to roughly 24% on average, it can be much higher in some cases.
Interpreting the coefficients of structural and cyclical descriptors
Central to this study, findings pertaining to agglomeration economies in shopping centres corroborate the literature on the subject. They clearly suggest that while larger size shopping centres involve greater competition among tenants, store clustering also generate substantially higher sales volumes, which translates into higher rents. When applied to 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Summary of findings
This study is an attempt to model shopping centre rents and to investigate whether agglomeration economies are a driving force in the rent determination process. It is based on physical and financial information obtained for seven super-regional, regional and community shopping centres in Quebec City. While financial data apply to the 1998-2000 period, leases were negotiated over a longer period that extends from 1976 to 2000. At this point, 784 stores are accounted for in the study. In addition to basic financial and physical characteristics, a series of five market structure and cyclical attributes are developed in order to capture the effect on rent of both commercial dynamics within shopping centres and overall economic situation. Main findings can be summarized as follows:
As expected, the prominent role of gross leasable area in the retail rent determination process clearly emerges from the model, the negative sign of the Ln_GLA coefficient indicating that unit rent decreases with store size;
Frontage is also a major determinant and exerts a positive influence on rent due to the enhanced visibility and attractiveness it confers to a store;
Quite interestingly, the presence of a jewellery impacts differently on rents depending on the size category of the shopping centre it belongs to. In community shopping centres, the effect is negative whereas it is positive in both regional and super-regional structures. A combination of relative scarcity, prestige location and agglomeration economies provides a sensible explanation to such findings;
A similar rationale applies -with even greater relevance -to clothing and shoe stores located in community and regional shopping centres;
Agglomeration economies are clearly at stake when it comes to interpreting the marginal contribution of restaurants to unit rents, with regional and super-regional centres commanding substantially higher rents than community ones;
Rent patterns differ though with respect to personal services and specialty stores. In spite of their relative abundance, the negative contribution of this retail category in community shopping centres reflects the bargaining power of local retailers that are at the very core of community centres' mission, namely proximity services;
Specialty stores located in super-regional centres also command lower unit rents due to the attraction they exert on high-tech goods consumers;
Since they occupy the central alley of shopping malls where consumer traffic is optimal, kiosks command the highest unit rents of all retail categories;
Anchor tenants do benefit, as expected, from a major rent discount which amounts, on average, to 24% of base rent;
Findings clearly suggest that while larger size shopping centres involve greater competition among tenants, store clustering generates substantial agglomeration economies that translate into higher rents;
Concentration levels in retail activity, as measured by the Herfindahl Index, impact negatively on rents;
The proportion of leasable space under negotiation in a given year strengthens the bargaining power of tenants, who consequently benefit from a rent discount;
Finally, a recessionary economic cycle affects retail rents negatively.
In short, this study corroborates previous research findings about the critical role played by anchor tenants in the generation of agglomeration economies as well as the importance of tenant mix, product diversity, quality of goods and image in the retail rent structuring process. While increased attractiveness has an overall positive effect on both sales and unit rents for most stores -namely in the case of kiosks -, they allow major tenants and other specialty goods retailers to negotiate lower rents with shopping centres' owners. Such factors however impact differently on rents depending on shopping centre size and profile.
Finally, retail structure within shopping centres and lease renewal strategies by owners will affect tenants' bargaining power and, therefore, rent levels.
Suggestion for further research
While this study is but a preliminary investigation into the retail rent dynamics, it raises several interesting issues namely with respect to the measurement of externalities and agglomeration, as opposed to dispersion, effects. While shopping centre configuration and design deserve further attention, resorting to concepts and analytical tools found in geography and spatial economics to measure such phenomena may lead to major developments in the field. 2,63 -60,07 19,51 -,081 -3,08 ,002 1,87 -78,57 25,94 -,080 -3,03 ,003 1,86 -4,48 4,30 -,021 -1,04 ,298 1,05 (Constant) 
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